Transhumanism Between the Ethics of Technoscience and the Challenge of Human Enhancement: A Comparative Study of Gilbert Hottois and Nick Bostrom

Abstract

This article examines the philosophical and ethical foundations of transhumanism in Gilbert Hottois and Nick Bostrom, focusing on the legitimacy and limits of technoscientific intervention in human nature. The comparison is not confined to particular enhancement technologies; it addresses competing conceptions of the human, the normative status of nature, and the place of technology in shaping future identities and capacities. Hottois approaches transhumanism through technoscience and pluralistic bioethics, with particular attention to ethical accompaniment, institutional deliberation, and revisability. Bostrom gives greater weight to individual freedom, enhancement, and the possible value of posthuman forms of life. Through a close reading of primary texts, the article compares their positions on enhancement, autonomy, dignity, risk, and justice. Both reject treating present human biology as a final moral norm, yet they differ in how they justify transformation: Hottois stresses pluralistic governance and ethical mediation, whereas Bostrom foregrounds choice and the exploration of posthuman value.